Before the Storm by Jackson Robert

Author:Jackson, Robert [Jackson, Robert]
Language: eng
Format: azw3
Publisher: Endeavour Press
Published: 2017-10-09T04:00:00+00:00

Chapter Eight – Day and Night Operations, November 1940-October 1941

The German attack on Coventry on the night of 14-15 November 1940 provoked an immediate outcry, both from the British public and in Government circles, for retaliatory raids to be launched without delay against German cities. Churchill and the War Cabinet, however, were concerned about the loss sustained by Bomber Command during August, September and October; this amounted to 228 aircraft, including those accidentally destroyed, and there were grave fears that a continued loss of this magnitude would completely outstrip bomber production. This was reflected in a minute from the Prime Minister to the Chief of Air Staff, dated 17 November 1940:

‘I watch these figures [of RAF losses] every day with much concern. My diagrams show that we are now not even keeping level, and there is a marked downward turn this week, especially in the Bomber Command. Painful as it is not to be able to strike heavy blows after an event like Coventry, yet I feel we should for the present nurse Bomber Command a little more. This can be done (1) by not sending so many to each of the necessary objectives, (2) by not coming down too low in the face of heavy prepared batteries and being content with somewhat less accuracy, and (3) by picking out soft spots where there is not too much organized protection, so as to keep up our deliveries of bomb content. There must be unexpecting towns in Germany where very little has been done in Air Raid Precautions and yet where there are military objectives of a minor order. Some of these could be struck at in the meanwhile.

‘I should feel differently about this if our bomber force were above five hundred, and if it were expanding. But having regard to the uncertainties of war, we must be very careful not to let routine bombing and our own high standards proceed without constant attention to our resources. These remarks do not apply, of course, to Italy, against which the full-scale risk should be run. The wounded “Littorio” is a fine target.’

Even bearing in mind that this minute was prompted by ‘much concern’ over Bomber Command’s losses its content is quite remarkable, for it appears to show that Churchill either failed to understand or chose to ignore the lessons learned by Bomber Command in its attacks on German targets over the preceding months. In the interests of conserving the bomber force, the Prime Minister was advocating precisely what the Air Staff had sought to avoid since the war began; the wastage of effort against targets of limited importance. His ideas ran contrary to the Air Staff’s faith in precision bombing, and he failed to appreciate that against certain types of heavily-defended target the low-level attack – which he was suggesting should be abandoned – held the greatest chance of success for minimum losses. The second paragraph of the minute is particularly revealing, for it shows that Churchill’s thoughts were dictated by naval considerations.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.